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Reviewed by Heather J. Sharkey, Department of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  hsharkey@sas.upenn.edu 
  
Alice Moore-Harell’s book is a carefully researched study of one chapter in the career of 
General Charles Gordon, the military careerist who remains one of the most compelling 
figures in the history of late nineteenth-century British imperialism.  Drawing on an 
extensive pool of archival sources from Europe, Egypt, and North America, the book 
considers the period of three years, from 1877 to 1880, when Gordon served as 
Governor-General of the Turco-Egyptian Sudan, a territory that had been conquered, 
incrementally expanded, and ruled by the armies of Egypt’s Muhammad Ali dynasty 
beginning in 1820. 
In 1877, Khedive Ismail asked Gordon to administer the Sudan with a special 
mandate to end the slave trade (though not slavery itself) in accordance with a convention 
that Egypt had recently signed.  Gordon accepted on condition that he be granted 
authority to direct all the provincial governors and to report exclusively to the khedive – 
thereby demanding a degree of centralized control unknown by previous governors-
general in the Sudan.   
 Gordon’s governor-generalship coincided with a fascinating moment in Egyptian, 
British, and Sudanese history.  The Turco-Egyptian empire was at its greatest 
geographical extent.  Indeed, the Sudanese territories entrusted to Gordon included parts 
of what are now Uganda, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia.  Egyptian finances were 
nevertheless suffering, making Egypt vulnerable to French and British economic and 
political encroachment.  Against this context, Gordon worked to consolidate the Sudan’s 
administration and placed the country on an independent financial footing for the first 
time since 1820 – a necessity given that Egypt’s treasury was in no state to offer 
subventions. 
 Conditions for Gordon were less than ideal.  Many officials in both Egypt and the 
Sudan resented his sweeping mandate as well as his status as a Briton and Christian, and 
therefore undermined or ignored his efforts.  Since many Egyptians regarded the Sudan 
as a punishment posting, morale among administrators was low while corruption 
(especially bribery and extortionate taxation) was rampant.  Meanwhile, efforts to combat 
the slave trade were hindered by the limited reach of the army (itself filled with slave 
conscripts), the adept organization of the slave merchants, and the participation of some 
Turco-Egyptian officials in the traffic.  It made matters more difficult still that slave-
owning itself was widely accepted and practiced within Sudanese Muslim society. 
 Moore-Harell describes Gordon as a political reformer who tried to establish a 
more locally responsive and conciliatory government.  Reversing longstanding Turco-
Egyptian policies that had sought to marginalize Sudanese Sufi leaders, Gordon adopted 
a tolerant attitude towards Sudanese Islam and included more Sudanese in his 
administration.  He worked to develop local infrastructures, for example, by improving 
Khartoum’s sewer system and water supply.  He tried to root out corruption, albeit with 
limited success.  More symbolically, perhaps, he affixed a suggestion and complaint box 
to the gates of his palace so that the people could express their concerns.  
Moore-Harell asserts that Gordon was neither a tool of British interests nor a 
modern Christian crusader – though many authors over the years have portrayed him in 
just this way.  Gordon, she argues, acted with local interests in mind while remaining 
loyal to khedivial, not British, authority.  Out of deference to and respect for local 
Muslim society, she mentions, Gordon forbade the Church Missionary Society (a British 
Anglican organization) from proselytizing among Sudanese Muslims, though he did 
allow them to pass through the country en route to non-Muslim regions in what is now 
Uganda.  
 Frustrated by the problems of administration and lacking an affinity to Khedive 
Tawfiq who succeeded Ismail in 1879, Gordon resigned his governor-generalship in 
January 1880.  Given his brief tenure, what, then, was the import of his rule, and how 
should historians consider it in light of the Sudanese history that followed?  Although the 
book’s sub-title suggests that Gordon’s rule in the Sudan was a “prologue to the 
Mahdiyya” (anticipating though not in itself causing the Mahdist revolution), Moore-
Harell makes the more interesting argument within the book that Gordon’s governor-
generalship anticipated British colonial (Anglo-Egyptian era) policies in certain respects 
– notably, in early attempts to isolate the southern provinces from the influence of 
northern traders with consequences for north-south dynamics.  She suggests, too, that 
Gordon’s experiment in centralized administration and financial self-sufficiency was an 
early episode in Sudan autonomy.  Extending her argument further, one could argue that 
some of the problems that Gordon encountered remain problems for the Sudanese central 
government today – notably, the challenge of maintaining effective control over a vast 
country with limited, inadequate resources. 
 Moore-Harell may not have been an admirer of Charles Gordon when she 
embarked on this project, but she became one by the end.  Until Gordon’s last day in 
office, she writes, he “invested all his energy in efforts to improve the public 
administration and to better the life of the Sudanese “(p. 53).  She concludes, “Justice, 
honesty, loyalty, perseverance, open ears, involvement in communal life, and the 
empathy he demonstrated, symbolised a new approach to the [Sudanese] population.  He 
proved that it was possible to institute a different administration, [and] that the Sudanese 
were entitled to an honest and honourable life without suffering from oppression….”  (p. 
233)  Focussing on a brief historical moment of dramatic political change, Gordon and 
the Sudan is a fascinating book that will appeal to historians of Egypt, Sudan, and the 
British Empire while perhaps also explaining some of Gordon’s enduring mystique.  
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